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 The Social Structure of Suicide1
 Peter S. Bearman2
 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
 A parsimonious structural model of the four forms of suicide - egoism,
 altruism, anomie, and fatalism -defined in Durkheim's Suicide is developed.
 The model explicitly defines the structural position of each forn of suicide by
 focusing on duality of social structure, while retaining an analytic distinction
 between social integration and normative regulation. A payoff from this
 approach is that fatalism and anomie are interpreted in the same framework
 as altruism and egoism. The result is a consistent account of the four fomns
 of suicide that is faithful to Durkheim's intentions to account for the aggregate
 suicide rate without recourse to the motivations of actors.
 KEY WORDS: suicide; social structure; networks; duality; anomie; fatalism.
 INTRODUCTION
 Durkheim argues that the suicide rate is a social fact that can be
 interpreted as an indicator of social solidarity within a society. One striking
 feature of the social suicide rate is its stability over time, from year to year
 showing less variance than the mortality rate (Durkheim, 1897/1951: 49).
 A central feature of the suicide rate is that it has a structure that is both
 stable over time and across contexts. We see indication of this structure in
 the stability of the suicide rate across different categories or groups of per-
 sons. Protestants have higher rates of suicide than Jews, entrepreneurs have
 higher rates than workers, and unmarried men are more likely to kill them-
 selves than those who are married, controlling for age. It is the stability of
 'This paper developed from lectures given in the Social Studies department at Harvard
 University in 1987.
 2Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North
 Carolina 27510.
 501
 0884-8971/91/0900-0501$06.50/0 ? 1991 Plenum Publishing Corporation
This content downloaded from 209.2.208.15 on Mon, 25 Mar 2019 16:00:30 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 502 Bearman
 the suicide rate, both overall and for groups or categories of persons, that
 allows Durkheim to interpret the suicide rate as an index and proxy for
 social solidarity (Durkheim, 1897/1951).
 A basic sociological insight implicit in Durkheim's work is the recog-
 nition that underlying the categorical groups that vary in their relative con-
 tribution to the suicide rate are structures of social relations, and that
 variation in the structure of social relations yields variation in the suicide
 rate. Thus in his treatment of religious society, for example, he shows that
 Catholics are distinct from Protestants because they are embedded in a
 structure of social relations that are Catholic - and that what protects
 Anglicans from suicide is not rhetoric but the fact that they have Catholic
 social relations (Durkheim, 1897/1951:152-171). It is the structure of social
 relations that bind and constrain the individual rather than the beliefs or
 dogmatic pronouncements of the church that protect individuals from
 suicide.
 This insight is only partially exploited in Durkheim's work. By focus-
 ing on the social relations in which people are embedded, Durkheim is
 able to define "egoism" and "altruism" - two of the four forms of suicide
 - in purely structural terms. Thus, egoism is defined in the limit as the
 absence of social relations within a given society, and altruism by the total
 presence of relations. Egoistic suicide is the suicide of the highly individu-
 ated modern man; altruistic suicide is the suicide of the barely individuated
 man. Problems appear in Durkheim's account of the other two basic forms
 of suicide - anomie and fatalism. Anomie is characterized by normless-
 ness, yet the social structure of normlessness is not defined. Fatalism is
 relegated to a footnote and treated as an exceptional case, discussed only
 because it is logically entailed by the other three forms (Durkheim,
 1897/1951:276).
 In this paper I develop a purely structural interpretation of Suicide
 that accounts for the four ideal forms of suicide - anomic, egoistic, altru-
 istic, and fatalistic. The model is consistent with Durkheim's goal of ac-
 counting for the suicide rate sociologically - that is, without recourse to
 the imputation of individual motive - and is consistent with Durkheim's
 imagery of the etiology for each form. It extends Durkheim in two central
 ways: First, the model allows for the representation of all four forms of
 suicide as positions in a social structure. Each type of suicide is associated
 with a unique pattern of interpersonal and group relations. This allows for
 a clear distinction between the egoistic and anomic forms of suicide.
 Second, the proposed model is falsifiable. While it is not likely that indi-
 vidual-level data appropriate for a direct test of the theory will be available,
 it is possible to evaluate components of the model drawing on extant data.
 As our interpretation of the social suicide rate rests upon its composition,
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 it is possible to suspend many assumptions about the social order and re-
 place them with empirical indicators. The basic payoff is that the approach
 developed in this paper enables a consistent formal definition of the social
 structural positions of individuals whose suicides make up the suicide rate.
 INTEGRATION AND REGULATION
 Durkheim defines social structure as the intersection of two inde-
 pendent parameters, integration and regulation. Here I define integration
 as the extent of social relations binding a person or a group to others such
 that they are exposed to the moral demands of the group. Integration may
 vary from complete embeddedness in a group - the fully connected clique
 - to the pure isolate without social relations. Regulation is defined as the
 normative or moral demands placed on the individual that come with mem-
 bership in a group. In the ideal, integration and regulation walk hand in
 hand, with each providing the context through which the other is repro-
 duced. But "abnormal" forms are possible, and an individual can occupy
 a position that is characterized by high integration and low moral regula-
 tion. By extension, whole societies can be abnormal as well, such that the
 level of integration can be below or above the level of normative regulation.
 Abnormal social forms are Durkheim's basic concern in The Division of
 Labor in Society (Durkheim, 1893/1984:291-340).
 Concern with the abnormality of the industrial West, which was re-
 flected in the higher suicide rates of developed societies, motivated Durk-
 heim's analysis of suicide as well. But his goals were more ambitious, for
 in Suicide, Durkheim was concerned both with the structure of individual
 relations and with the structure of whole societies. In Suicide, Durkheim
 hoped not only to make sense of the aggregate suicide rate - a task not
 unlike modeling the increase of restitutive law in the Division of Labor
 but also to decompose the rate into its constituent parts. He wanted to be
 able to identify the structural aspects of social positions occupied by persons
 that subjected them as a category to varying suicidogenetic currents (Durk-
 heim, 1897/1951:323-325). As much of the commentary on Suicide suggests
 that Durkheim failed to provide an analytically clear distinction between
 anomie and egoism, one has the sense that he was only partially successful
 in achieving the second goal (Johnson, 1965; Giddens, 1971; Lukes, 1973;
 Jones, 1986).
 Linking the social and positional levels of analysis in one framework
 that rests solely on the structural parameters used by Durkheim - regula-
 tion and integration -makes it possible to see an analytic distinction be-
 tween the four forms of suicide. The essential step is to make explicit the
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 relationship between individual social position and the macrolevel (societal)
 integration of groups by focusing on the inherent duality in all tangible
 social structures.
 Duality is a necessary by-product of human social relations. In the
 social network perspective, our relations with others are constituted by a
 flow that connects individuals as nodes. Each flow defines a unique rela-
 tion, a type of tie. Groups of persons are constituted by dense inter-
 relations across one or many ties. Friendship groups, teams, churches, and
 families are all groups that may be observed empirically. Persons belong
 to many groups. At the interpersonal level, we are constituted by these
 relations that we have with others by virtue of our multiple affiliations,
 that is, by virtue of our membership in families, teams, churches, and
 cliques. At the macrolevel, persons are flows that connect groups. The
 fact of interpersonal relations necessarily defines a social structure of
 group relations. Social structure evidences a duality encompassing the joint
 constitution of both the group and interpersonal networks in which per-
 sons are embedded.
 We can represent the four forms of suicide in a two-by-two table as
 reported in Table I. The rows report integration, here partitioned into two
 categories, "low" and "high." The columns of Table I report regulation also
 partitioned as "low" and "high." Thus each cell in the table identifies a
 unique position defined with respect to integration and regulation. I first
 consider the off-diagonal cells, egoism and altruism, where integration and
 regulation are simultaneous, and then move to the abnormal forms of sui-
 cide defined by an asymmetry of integration and regulation.
 THE OFF-DIAGONAL: FROM MECHANICAL TO
 ORGANIC SOCIETY
 The ideal typical development of society lies along the off diagonal
 of Table I, from mechanical society to organic society. Each society is seen
 to be associated with a characteristic form of suicide, altruism and egoism.
 Below I focus on ideal-typical structures, and only then turn to the tangible
 approximations of each ideal in modern society.
 Altruistic Suicide and Mechanical Solidarity
 Consider only the ideal-typical mechanical society composed of the
 replication of homogeneous elements, rather than tangible societies ap-
 proximating this ideal (Durkheim, 1893/1984:132). In such a context it is
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 Table I. Forms of Suicide
 Regulation
 Integration Low High
 High Anomic Altruistic
 Low Egoistic Fatalistic
 awkward to speak of individuals, for each person occupies a position struc-
 turally equivalent to the next, that is, one cannot distinguish individuals on
 the basis of the relations they hold with others. Nor is there the uniquely
 modern phenomena of personality and consciousness, which appear with
 the division of labor - the appearance of the chief (Durkheim, 1893/1984:
 143). The mechanical society is a society of fully integrated homogeneous
 nodes, in which each node is either a full member of the group or is out
 completely. In such a context, integration and regulation are coterminous;
 all individuals are integrated and all share a common consciousness.
 According to Durkheim,
 For the individual to occupy so little a place in collective life he must be almost
 completely absorbed in the group and the latter, accordingly, very highly integrated.
 For the parts to have so little life of their own, the whole must indeed be a compact,
 continuous mass . ... As they consist of few elements, everyone leads the same life;
 everything is common to all, ideas, feelings, occupations. (1897/1951:220-221)
 In the absence of the division of labor, the group combines within
 itself all of the memberships an individual in the modern world may hold,
 that is, mechanical society is simultaneously the conjugal, religious, and po-
 litical society of its members. Since there is but one group to which the
 equivalent persons belong, it is possible to represent the structure of me-
 chanical society as a fully connected clique. As there is only one group,
 there is no duality.
 Egoistic Suicide and Organic Solidarity
 Whereas the suicide of mechanical society is altruistic, the suicide
 of organic society is egoistic. Again, consider only the ideal form, rather
 than real approximations. With the division of labor comes personality,
 the occupancy of a distinct position in society. As the ideal mechanical
 society is characterized by pure homogeneity, organic society is charac-
 terized by heterogeneity in which the process of individuation associated
 with modernity has reached its limit. Individual personality is freed from
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 the bonds of collective personality, and as all people are unique, nothing
 social (common) remains to regulate them. Each individual pursues highly
 individuated ends using others as means. In such a context there is no
 group to which one could be integrated, and each man or woman is an
 isolate. It follows that as there are no groups larger than the individual,
 there is no duality. Organic society, in the limit, is represented as a purely
 reflexive graph.
 This representation of organic society appears to contradict
 Durkheim's argument that organic solidarity is based, in part, on the func-
 tional interdependence of individuals necessitated by the division of labor
 (Durkheim, 1893/1984:228). Because interdependence is intrinsically rela-
 tional, social solidarity in organic society is often thought to be a by-product
 of exchange relations. This line of thought, associated with Spenser, is re-
 jected by Durkheim, who argues that exchange presupposes common
 norms, and that exchanges in organic society are not the vehicles through
 which individuals are integrated into the social order. Functional inter-
 dependence resulting from the division of labor cannot yield roles. Without
 a role structure, there are no social relations.
 Durkheim's argument is subtle. Recognizing that individuals use ex-
 change relations as means for the achievement of individual ends,
 Durkheim argues that exchange in organic society will never transcend self-
 interest. Consider the simple case of the clothier who exchanges cloth for
 meat with the butcher. The exchange, and therefore the temporary relation
 between the two, is necessitated by the division of labor and yields, as a
 by-product, specialized interdependence. In the ideal, the clothier ex-
 changes cloth with the butcher who offers the best terms of trade. Both
 parties are insensitive to prior exchanges; each exchange relation appears
 as an independent trial. Both parties enter the exchange with their ends
 defined before the relation is formed, and nothing that they do while in
 the relation shapes these ends. Because the relation fails to expose either
 to the normative demands of the other, the relation is asocial. Roles as
 buyer and seller are exchanged and a stable role structure, which implies
 norms governing action, is not induced from the relation itself (Durkheim,
 1893/1984).
 In the ideal, organic interdependence will never move beyond these
 ephemeral and temporary relations that mask self-interest, even if the same
 parties enter into repeated exchanges, since the terms of trade remain the
 same. The fact of connectivity entailed by interdependence does not mean
 that individuals are embedded in social relations - they remain, structur-
 ally, egoists.
 The importance of a role structure can be easily seen if we imagine
 that our clothier runs out of cloth and that the butcher, motivated by moral
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 sentiments binding him to humanity,3 gives the clothier meat as a gift. With
 the gift, a role structure appears. The butcher is giver, the clothier is taker.
 Both parties are now exposed to the normative demands of the other, which
 are attached to the giver and taker roles. The gift is the first truly social
 relation; each role is possible only by virtue of the other being occupied
 (Mauss, 1967; Levi-Strauss, 1949). This transformation of the exchange re-
 lation is what makes social integration in organic society possible through
 interdependence. While it is natural for exchange relations under capitalism
 to be transformed into stable dependency relations, Durkheim argues that
 it is a mistake to see in the fact of interdependence the basis for solidarity
 (1984).
 Recall that I defined integration as the presence of social relations
 binding a person to others such that they are exposed, by virtue of the
 relations, to the normative demands of those to whom they are tied. Func-
 tional interdependence resulting from the division of labor does not yield
 integration beyond that provided by the collective conscience that enables
 exchange.
 Tangible Approximations
 Neither mechanical nor organic society exists as portrayed in the
 ideal type. The line of social development moves down the off diagonal
 from mechanical to organic (from altruism to egoism) but nowhere have
 the extremes of each cell been reached. Tangible social structure lies
 somewhere in the middle. Yet approximations to each ideal do occur. The
 mechanical society is an ideal that early bureaucratic social organizations
 strove to achieve and it is an ideal that underlies most modern armies.
 The flea market in economic theory is the ideal of the organic society. In
 the first setting, the social relations of individuals formed in the larger
 society are stripped away, and the recruits are inserted into and participate
 in the group as if they had no previous identity. In the flea market, order
 emerges from pure heterogeneity as buyers and sellers exchange both roles
 and goods.
 For the early bureaucracies, enormous energies were poured into as-
 suring the loss of identity derived from membership in the larger society
 - especially in conjugal society where people are thought to be most
 acutely sensitive to particularistic demands. It followed that celibacy was
 3Durkheim argues that a feeling of "solidarity with humanity" may arise from the frequency
 of interactions in organic society. Necessarily, the collective sentiments are generalized, and
 as a result, do not strongly bind individuals normatively. Of course, the butcher who gives
 away meat on the basis of these sentiments is not going to be a butcher for very long.
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 demanded, engineered physically in the beginning, and subsequently
 through clerical renunciation. Only the socially dead could serve in the
 bureaucratic order - that is, persons so fully integrated into and regulated
 by one group that they would ruthlessly adhere to its normative demands
 (Patterson, 1982).
 In the modern army, the same social energies are expended to strip
 recruits from their earlier identities, and to embed them in the group life.
 The mechanisms are less dramatic, of course, than those of the early bu-
 reaucratic states, but the markers of civil society that report individual per-
 sonality, for example, hair and clothing style, are removed upon entrance
 to boot camp. One finds the same insistence on the equivalence of persons
 within ranks, so that each individual is transposable from one setting to
 another. Finally, use of collective sanctions guarantees a common norma-
 tive structure (Heckathorn, 1988; Waller, 1944). Some heterodox religious
 groups are associated with similar social structures. The modern mechanical
 societies closely approximate the ideal type, insofar as they simultaneously
 combine regulation and integration through administrative fiat, totally em-
 bedding individuals into one group so that competing normative demands
 cannot be heard.
 Pure heterogeneity, in which there are no groups larger than the in-
 dividual, such that all relations are instrumental exchanges through which
 individuals use others to achieve their unique ends, is the limit to which
 organic society is directed. It is only an analytic fiction, but useful for imag-
 ining social structure when regulation and integration are simultaneously
 absent. The flavor is unattractive, reminiscent of Hannah Arendt's discus-
 sion of the structure of loneliness during the Third Reich (Arendt,
 1973:478).
 DUALITY
 Duality, as an orienting concept in sociology, is most often associated
 with Georg Simmel (1908/1971), whose imagery of individuals and social
 circles as jointly defining "distinct levels of social structure which nonethe-
 less mutually constitute one another," can be seen as providing a basic
 framework in the social network area (Breiger, 1990). But duality is implicit
 in Durkheim's analysis of suicide as well. Recall that the central idea is
 that the multiple group affiliations of persons yield at the same moment
 both a structure of individual relations and a structure of group relations.
 Real social structures, rather than the ideal images of mechanical and or-
 ganic societies in which duality is absent because integration and regulation
 are coterminous, are defined by the intersection of these two levels. This
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 imagery associates each of the four forms of suicide to a discrete social
 position.
 An Application of Duality
 Consider a second model of organic society also faithful to Durk-
 heim's imagery in Suicide. Define society as constituted by many groups,
 each with persons as members. Durkheim refers to these groups as socie-
 ties, and measures individual integration as integration into conjugal, re-
 ligious, political, and occupational society. Define individual integration
 with respect to relations binding an individual to others within a "society."
 Define social integration as the extent of group to group relations that are
 a necessary product of the overlap of persons' memberships in named
 groups. Social integration is dual to individual integration.
 To illustrate duality more formally, consider the set of n x m adja-
 cency matrices reporting the person to group affiliations for mechanical
 society, organic society, and a fictive modern society, as reported in
 Table II, part A. Further assume all persons and all groups are represented
 for each society. Array persons across the rows and groups down the col-
 umns of each matrix. Affiliations between persons and groups are reported
 as a "1" in cell ij, which indexes the relation between person i and group
 j. Note that the mechanical society may thus be represented by an n x 1
 matrix. In contrast, the representation of the ideal-typical organic society
 would assume the form of a square (n x n) matrix, each individual is his
 or her own group, with l's only on the main diagonal. This follows because,
 in the absence of social relations, there can be no groups to which indi-
 viduals belong. The person to group matrix for the hypothetical modern
 society reports individuals with more than one group affiliation. Multiple
 group affiliations, or what Simmel would refer to as overlapping social
 circles, make duality possible.
 Label the person to group matrices, as reported in Table II, Part A,
 the PG matrix. It can be shown, following Breiger (1974), that by ordinary
 (inner-product) matrix multiplication of the PG matrix and its transpose
 (PGt) that one yields a person to person matrix. Likewise, ordinary matrix
 multiplication of (tPG) and PG matrices generates the dual group to group
 matrix (Breiger, 1974).
 Part B reports the interpersonal networks induced from the person
 to group matrix. Part C reports the networks for the group to group
 relations. Neither organic society (ideal) or mechanical society (ideal)
 evidence duality. Data on relations at either level of society fully account
 for the structure of social relations at the other. There are no degrees
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 Table 11. Three Views of the Duality of Social Structure
 A. Person to group networks
 Mechanical society Organic society Modern society
 Groups Groups Groups
 Persons 1 2 3 4 5 6 Persons 1 2 3 4 5 6 Persons 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 1 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 5 1 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 0 1 0 1 0 0 6 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 1 1 0 1 7 0 0 1 0 1 1
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 B. Person to person (interpersonal) networks
 Mechanical society Organic society Modern society
 Persons Persons Persons
 Persons 1 2 3 4 5 6 Persons 1 2 3 4 5 6 Persons 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 0 0 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 1 2 1 1 0 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 2 0 1 4 2 2 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 1 0 1 2 2 1 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 1 1 0 2 1 3
 C. Group to group network
 Mechanical society Organic society Modern society
 Groups Groups Groups
 Groups 1 2 3 4 5 6 Groups 1 2 3 4 5 6 Groups 1 2 3 4 5 6
 1 6 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 1 2 1 0 3 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 1 3 2 2 2 4 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 2 2 4 2 1 5 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 0 1 2 2 3 1 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 1 0 2 1 1 3
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 of freedom. On the other hand, information about the structure of per-
 sonal relations in the fictitious society cannot alone describe the struc-
 ture of group to group relations. Social integration - the structure of
 relations between groups - is observably independent of personal inte-
 gration. Asymmetries in the extent of integration across both levels yield
 the four structurally unique social positions that are associated with the
 four forms of suicide.
 As persons become more and more individuated, the normative de-
 mands and moral regulation placed upon them by virtue of their group
 memberships decrease proportionally with their involvement in the life of
 the group. The more groups that an individual belongs to, the less he or
 she is regulated. While subject to normative regulation of many groups,
 the highly individuated modern person is freed from constraint and regu-
 lation because he or she is involved only marginally in multiple groups,
 none of which are fully enveloping.
 Egoistic suicide is the suicide of the modern world; it is the suicide
 of the highly individuated person with but weak bonds to others across
 all of the spheres of social life, what Durkheim labels religious, conjugal,
 political, and occupational society. Durkheim defines egoism with respect
 to integration into a single "society," but the ideal egoist is marginally
 integrated into all societies simultaneously. The ideal egoist is an unmar-
 ried middle-aged male protestant professional. The structural position of
 the egoist is one of low integration and, consequently, low normative
 regulation.
 In the ideal-typical model, for egoistic and for altruistic suicide, inte-
 gration and regulation are simultaneous. In the case of egoism, the absence
 of integration prevents moral regulation; for the altruistic suicide, total in-
 tegration of the individual into the group leads to excessive regulation. In
 neither instance is duality - where asymmetries in the extent of regulation
 and integration exist - a core phenomena. Yet it is necessary to see how
 duality operates for cases where the ideal structure is only an ideal.
 THE MAIN DIAGONAL: ANOMIE AND FATALISM AS
 PATHOLOGICAL FORMS
 The off diagonal, from altruism to egoism, corresponds to the histori-
 cal movement from mechanical to organic society. In theory this movement
 is even such that social integration and regulation will be simultaneous.
 The cell entries on the main diagonal must thus be "pathological," repre-
 senting conditions for abnormal social context in which regulation has been
 decoupled from integration. Durkheim refers to these contexts as
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 pathological, and views them as deviations from the expected development
 trajectory.
 As egoism and altruism are pure opposites, each condition a reflection
 of an individual's integration into the social order, anomie and fatalism are
 also pure opposites, a reflection of the extent to which an individual is
 regulated by society. Anomie is defined as the social condition of unregu-
 lated persons, fatalism is characterized by excessive regulation. Durkheim's
 imagery is suggested in the two quotations below:
 The third sort of suicide, [anomic] results from man's activity lacking regulation
 and his consequent sufferings . . . In anomic suicide, society's influence is lacking
 in the basically individual passions, thus leaving them without a check-rein.
 (Durkheim, 1897/1951:258)
 The above considerations show that there is a type of suicide the opposite of anomic
 suicide, just as egoistic and altruistic suicides are opposites. It is the suicide deriving
 from excessive regulation, that of persons with futures pitilessly blocked and
 passions violently choked by oppressive discipline. It is the suicide of very young
 husbands, of the married woman who is childless. So for completeness' sake, we
 should set up a fourth suicidal type . . .. To bring out the ineluctable and inflexible
 nature of a rule against which there is no appeal, and in contrast with the expression
 "anomy" which has just been used, we might call it fatalistic suicide. (Durkheim,
 1897/1951:276)
 Durkheim speaks only of regulation in these passages, yet anomie and fa-
 talism, if they are any more than mere rhetorical flourish, must be associ-
 ated with a unique structural position that can be defined simultaneously
 by both parameters of social structure - integration and regulation. I de-
 fine the structural position of both forms below.
 Anomic Suicide: High Integration and Low Regulation
 Durkheim defines anomie as normlessness, resulting from the absence
 of regulation. Implied is that the anomic suicide is the suicide of an indi-
 vidual who is integrated into the social world, for otherwise he or she would
 be classified as egoists. The necessary condition for anomie is that indi-
 viduals must be integrated into groups and yet not be regulated by the
 normative demands of the group. Since membership in groups entails ex-
 posure to norms that reside in the group, the anomic position seems con-
 tradictory. How is it possible that a person integrated into a society is
 without moral regulation?
 Solving this apparent contradiction is fundamental if we are to pre-
 serve the fourfold classification of suicide as reflecting unique social posi-
 tions. There is no doubt that Durkheim fails in his attempt to adequately
 specify the structural basis for anomie - that is, normlessness in a context
 of individual integration. This has led many critics to argue that the egoism
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 Table III. The Social Structure of Anomie
 A. Person to group matrix for hypothetical society
 Peer Family 1 Work Religious Club Family 2 Person to group group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4 group 5 group 6
 P1 Adult 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 P2 Teen1 1 0 0 0 0 1 P3 Teen 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 P4 Adult 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 P5 Adult 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 P6 Adult 4 0 0 1 1 0 1 P7 Adult 5 0 0 1 0 1 1
 B. Interpersonal matrix for hypothetical society
 Adult 1 Teen 1 Teen 2 Adult 2 Adult 3 Adult 4 Adult 5
 Person to group P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P1 Adult 1 2 0 0 2 1 1 1 P2 Teen 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 P3 Teen 2 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 P4 Adult 2 2 0 1 4 2 2 2 P5 Adult 3 1 0 1 2 2 1 0 P6 Adult 4 1 1 0 2 1 3 2 P7 Adult5 1 1 0 2 0 2 3
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 C. Group to group matrix for hypothetical society
 Peer Family 1 Work Religious Club Family 2 Group to group group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4 group 5 group 6
 Gl Peer 2 1 0 0 0 1 G2 Family 1 3 1 2 1 0 G3 Work 0 1 3 2 2 2 G4 Church 0 2 2 4 2 1 G5 Club 0 1 2 2 3 1 G6 Family 2 1 0 2 1 1 3
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 a
 Family 1 Church
 Group 2 Group 4
 Peer Group Work
 Group I Group 3
 \Family 2 Cub
 Group 6 Group S
 b
 Fig. 1. (a) Graph representation of Table III, Part B. (b) Graph representation of
 Table III, Part C.
 and anomie are the same, both driven by insufficient individual integration
 into society (Johnson, 1965). It is not necessary to jettison the basic
 Durkheimian framework to yield a consistent model of suicide; the analytic
 distinction between egoism and anomie may be retained by focusing on
 the duality of social structure.
 I believe this is implicit in Durkheim's treatment of anomie in Suicide,
 where he subtly shifts attention away from individual social relations (which
 define integration), and turns instead to the structure of group relations in
 society. Durkheim argues that anomie is a psychic condition, experienced
 by persons living in societies in temporary disequilibrium. Anomic social
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 positions are seen as temporary products of crises that disrupt economic
 and social life. The poor man who suddenly becomes very rich, the farmer
 who enters the market in times of economic prosperity, and the banker
 who loses his fortune in depression experience status transitions, which be-
 cause they occupy a liminal position between their memberships in the old
 world (which provide moral guidance) and the new (with a competing set
 of norms) yield dissonance. The social position of the anomic individual is
 defined not by his or her integration into conjugal, religious, or occupa-
 tional groups, but by their relations. A bankrupt banker may still belong
 to the church of the fortunate, but his "co-workers" are the unemployed.
 The normative values of each world no longer provide a consistent frame-
 work for action. Dissonance may be temporary, as individuals struggle to
 achieve balanced networks by dropping older relations and joining new
 groups, but the structural position is defined as the occupancy of social
 groups that are disjoint at the level of social integration. Crises in modern
 society induce occupants of disjoint groups - and hence anomie as a social
 condition.
 Anomic Social Positions: Adolescence in Modern Society
 Anomie as dissonance resulting from the occupancy of social groups
 that are disjoint at the level of social integration may be a characteristic
 position of modern adolescents. The focus is of interest, for the adolescent
 suicide rate has grown rapidly in recent years, while adolescent suicides
 were extremely rare when Durkheim wrote Suicide. In contrast to the ado-
 lescent of the 19th century, the adolescent of today often spends substantial
 amounts of time and energy in social worlds quite distant from the adults
 who have putative moral authority over his or her behavior. The modern
 adolescent lives for many years in a liminal state, in two worlds that may
 or may not intersect.
 The teen today is often a member of two separate societies, the family
 of origin and the peer group. In both, the adolescent is integrated, and
 therefore subject to the normative demands and regulation of each. But
 the social worlds of the family and the peer group are frequently inde-
 pendent of each other, and the norms governing action and deportment
 that each society exerts on the teen are, consequently, often experienced
 as contradictory. Many find it difficult to reconcile the conflicting normative
 demands entailed by these memberships.
 The normative dissonance experienced by the teen is the same as ano-
 mie. Just as the lottery winner who is suddenly catapulted out of his world
 of stable and known norms and expectations that are shaped by social
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 relations with others, into the world of the rich (with its own norms gov-
 erning action), finds himself to be in an anomic state, the teen who is every
 day embedded in worlds with conflicting expectations and values is cast
 into an anomic social position. Neither the dissonant nor the anomic may
 find guidance governing action and desire in the moral regulation of the
 group. Normative dissonance is a product of the decoupling of the worlds
 of peers and family. While the teen is integrated into a society, the group
 to group network of family and peers is segregated, and it is the separation
 of these two worlds that generates for each the conflicting norms and values
 to which the individual is subject.
 Thus we have the structural position of high integration and low regu-
 lation - the individual who is anomic is integrated into groups, but the
 groups are segregated in the dual network at the level of social integration.
 The adolescent is especially likely to occupy such a position, relative to oth-
 ers, for dissonance is the product of belonging to few groups, rather than
 many groups. If people belong to many groups, then the normative influence
 of each group to which they belong is lessened. Anomie is, in this sense,
 insufficient individuation in a context of social heterogeneity.
 Relabel the rows and columns of the modern society person to group
 matrix as reported in Table II, part A so that it reports person to group
 relations for adolescents and adults as in Table III. As before, persons are
 arrayed across the rows of the matrix while groups are arrayed down the
 columns. The person to person matrix is shown in part B. The group to
 group matrix is shown in part C. The associated graph representations of
 the person to person and group to group matrices are shown in Fig. 1 for
 ease of presentation.
 Consider first the person to group matrix reported in Table III, part
 A. Persons 2 and 3 are teens, holding memberships in group 1 (a peer
 group) and families 2 and 6. Persons 1, 4, 5, and 6 and 7 are adults, af-
 filiated with work, church, club, and family groups. Part B reports the per-
 son to person network drawn from the person to group matrix. Note from
 the associated graph representation that all of the individuals are inte-
 grated, that is, they are all tied to others in the population. On the other
 hand, the graph of the group to group network reveals the structural
 position of anomie. The world of peers and the world of adults are, net of
 the family ties constituted by the adolescents, radically decoupled.
 Assume that norms governing action are shared by individuals who
 occupy the same social circles. Individuals who bridge social worlds are
 thus exposed to conflicting norms. Tightly integrated into two social worlds
 that are decoupled at the level of social integration, the adolescent
 occupying this contradictory position is subject to the conflicting norms as-
 sociated with each world. Individuals who are highly integrated into two
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 social worlds, such that their dual (group to group) network is segregated,
 are more likely to feel dissonance than those whose personal networks span
 multiple groups that are interwoven. Normative dissonance yields norm-
 lessness, the absence of regulation, despite integration.
 Fatalism
 Durkheim saw that the model of social structure he proposed, com-
 pletely defined by two independent parameters, integration and regulation,
 necessarily induced four social positions that would each yield a unique form
 of suicide. I show that it is simple to represent a fatalistic social position,
 that the representation I propose fits the examples that Durkheim provides,
 that it is not difficult to identify other positions in modem society that are
 structurally equivalent to those Durkheim identifies, and that it is possible
 to preserve integration and regulation as independent parameters of social
 structure, by demonstrating that fatalism is a structural position defined by
 the intersection, in one person, of low integration and high regulation.
 Consider Durkheim's examples of fatalistic individuals, the married
 woman without children and the slave (Durkheim, 1897/1951:276). Focus
 on the married woman without children, and recall that this is an example
 more appropriate for the 19th century than it is for today. While tangibly
 blocked from participation in group life beyond the sphere of domestic so-
 ciety, the woman did not benefit from marriage, which served instead to
 "aggravate her tendency to suicide" (Durkheim, 1897/1951:189). Children,
 and not the relationship to the husband, protected the woman against
 suicide. Durkheim argues that
 the fact remains that the family is the essential factor in the immunity of married
 persons, that is, the family as the whole group of parents and children. Of course
 since husband and wife are members, they share in producing this result, however
 not as husband or wife but as father and mother, as functionaries of the family
 association. (1951:198)
 Likewise, the widower suffers
 not because his marriage is ended but because the family which he heads is disorganized.
 The departure, not of the wife but of the mother, causes the disaster. (1951:188)
 The conjugal relation integrates neither the wife nor the husband fully into
 domestic society. Men are marginally integrated into domestic society be-
 cause they are members of multiple groups that define their social identity.
 The more individuated the husband, the less salient and normatively con-
 straining is his relation to his wife. For the wife, the social relation that
 binds her into the one group to which she may belong is fictive.
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 Fig. 2. The structural position of fatalism.
 The childless wife does not suffer simply from insufficient integration.
 Rather she suffers from massive normative regulation resulting from her
 occupancy of the wife role without independent social identity as a mother.
 Marginally integrated into conjugal society, she is nonetheless viewed and
 treated by others as fully integrated. The more affiliations that the husband
 has, the more a powerful consensual norm governs the behavior of the wife,
 such that the weaker the conjugal tie, the greater the oppression.
 The fatalist has no identity beyond the role that he or she must
 occupy. The slave has no identity without the master, the married woman
 without children has no identity without the husband. And yet the wife
 is without real social ties to the husband and the slave is not integrated
 into society by his tie to the master. Both are cast adrift without mean-
 ingful social ties. Yet their role embeds them in the dense, homogeneous
 world of their alters' group to group network, which subjects them to the
 regulation of consensual norms governing their behavior. The more
 groups in the husband's group to group network, and therefore the
 weaker the relation to the wife, the greater is the normative constraint
 that she experiences.4
 4There is logically a threshold that determines fatalism. For example, if the husband's group
 affiliations are very diffuse, the sentiments held by all the members will be generalized and
 consequently lack moral force. On the other hand, if the husband's affiliations are narrow,
 the effect of group cohesion, however strong, on the wife should be less.
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 Reproduction of Fatalism
 The exchange relations of organic society tend naturally, as a result
 of their conflictual base, to be transformed into social relations of depend-
 ence. The disjoint group network of the anomic tends naturally to revert
 to balance, as persons strive to reduce dissonance, by dropping group re-
 lations that they experience as contradictory. Egoism and anomie are, in
 this sense, positions in a social structure that are inherently unstable. An
 interesting property of fatalism is that it induces in the fatalist behaviors
 that reproduce, rather than transform, their position.
 By striving to be integrated into conjugal society, the wife without
 children serves only to accentuate others' perceptions of her as integrated,
 without a corresponding change in the inherent asymmetry of the conjugal
 relation. Her efforts to secure a tie to her husband enslave her further to
 the ideals of others.
 A similar position is occupied by those on the periphery of a clique
 where the failed efforts to secure a role within the group induce others to
 believe the individual is integrated. Consider the youth, striving to gain ac-
 ceptance from those in the center of a clique, by adopting the behaviors and
 the deportment of the leaders whose position rests on their ability to redefine
 the standards necessary for membership. At the precise moment the periph-
 eral member appropriates the latest style, it slides out of fashion to be re-
 placed by a new innovation. Persons on the inside of the clique know who
 is in and who is out - and when those who are out act "in," being "in" is
 redefined. Yet persons not in the clique are unaware of the fine distinctions
 that govern being in or being out, precisely because of the concerted efforts
 of those on the periphery to gain acceptance. Their efforts succeed only in
 enslaving themselves to a normative ideal that is, like that of the childless
 wife, fictive, because it is not sustained by an actual social relation.
 In both instances the structural position is the same: the fatalist oc-
 cupies the position of a peripheral member within one social group, such
 that others believe he or she occupies a fixed role and orient their relations
 with the fatalist as if that role was tangibly occupied. Fatalism is a struc-
 tural position induced by the asymmetry of individual integration and
 group integration. This position yields an asymmetry in perception. Fatal-
 ists are governed by the formal occupancy of a role. In the eyes of others
 they have identity only as a role occupant. In their own eyes they are
 without social ties and therefore purpose. Fatalists do not derive
 protection from the role, for it comes to them from the outside. The role,
 but not the individual who occupies it, is reproduced by the others that
 surround him or her.
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 If the group to group network in which the fatalist's alter is embedded
 is cohesive, the resulting asymmetry in the primary tie will be large, and
 the constraint that the fatalist experiences correspondingly more powerful.
 We can represent this position as a graph as in Fig. 2.
 DISCUSSION
 The ideal typical development of human societies lies along the di-
 agonal from mechanical to organic society. Each ideal has its characteristic
 form of suicide. In both, the twin dimensions of social structure
 integration and regulation - walk hand in hand. They are simultaneous.
 The path of social development may be interrupted and pathological forms
 may appear. These forms are characterized by the decoupling of regulation
 and integration. At the individual level, this decoupling is experienced as
 anomie or fatalism. The anomic social condition is marked by the asym-
 metry between individuation (low) and social heterogeneity. Individuals
 occupying an anomic social position are thus integrated, but only margin-
 ally regulated. On the other extreme, individuals occupying a fatalistic
 position are confronted with massive regulation in a context of individual
 isolation.
 For years, sociologists have worked hard to preserve a basic
 Durkheimian insight - that the collective life of the group is a function
 of the density and multiplexity of social relations that serve to bind in-
 dividuals into a world larger than themselves. In doing so, many have
 rejected an important Durkheimian insight: in abnormal contexts, inte-
 gration and regulation are not isomorphic. These abnormal contexts are
 evidence of a decoupling of the group and individual levels of society.
 Persons may be integrated, yet be subject to dissonance and normlessness
 because the groups that they belong to are disjoint. Likewise, individuals
 may be subject to constraint despite the fact that they are not integrated.
 Both asymmetries arise from duality, a measurable aspect of all social
 structure.
 It is highly unlikely that we will ever have access to data that can
 properly test the representation of each form proposed above. On the
 other hand, we already have data that can be used to evaluate central
 components of the model at the social rather than the individual level.
 Survey-based ego-centered network data can be used to estimate the
 extent to which persons assigned a priori to groups differ with respect
 to group to group integration. Mixing matrices similar to those currently
 employed in the study of disease transmission are natural avenues for
 identifying the attributes of persons who occupy bridge positions
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 between social worlds and thus are likely to experience dissonance
 (Sattenspiel, 1990; Anderson et al., 1990). Likewise, saturation sampling
 of relatively large populations -schools and neighborhoods, for exam-
 ple - has been proposed as a technique for measuring individual inte-
 gration into both interpersonal and group networks. (Rindfuss et al.,
 1988). Simultaneous analyses of both levels of social structure allow re-
 searchers to identify the distribution of fatalistic and anomic positions
 by attributes of persons.
 Insight into the social structure of suicide is derived from the explicit
 recognition of the duality of social structure that yields social positions de-
 fined by the intersection of the interpersonal networks of individuals and
 the group networks to which they give rise.
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